FCC REGULATION: INDECENCY BY INTEREST
GROUPS
PATRICIA DAZA 1

ABSTRACT
FCC regulations are among the most controversial
administrative law regulations because of their impact on
broadcast television. This iBrief analyzes the history of FCC
regulation and highlights the problems associated with the current
model. Applying theories of economics, this iBrief proposes
solutions to the current problems of selective enforcement and
vagueness in enforcement. While the Supreme Court recognized
that FCC regulation is necessary, it is also necessary for there to
be a clearer model for how the agency should be run.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
In a study used by the Parents Television Council (“PTC”) in their
lobbying practices, researchers found that “20 percent of 2 to 7 year olds, 46
percent of 8 to 12 year olds, and 56 percent of 13 to 17 year olds have
televisions in their bedrooms.” 2 However, the PTC does not focus their
efforts on encouraging parents to spend more time with their children but
instead lobbies aggressively to Congress and the Federal Communications
Council (“FCC”) for increased censorship of indecent programming on
broadcast television. This special interest group is among many using the
1978 Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 3 as the
backbone for their lobbying. The case involved a daytime broadcast of
George Carlin’s “Seven Dirty Words” sketch in which he repeated a slew of
expletives. The Court found that because of the unique, invasive nature of
1

J.D./L.L.M. Candidate, 2008, Duke University School of Law; B.A. in
Political Science, cum laude, University of California, Los Angeles. The author
is extremely grateful to Professor Lange and the members of the Duke Law and
Technology Review for their guidance.
2
MediaWise.org, MediaQuotient: National Survey of Family Media Habits,
Knowledge, and Attitudes,
http://www.mediafamily.org/research/report_mqexecsum.shtml (last visited Feb.
16, 2008). The study also reported that the average American child watches an
average of twenty-five hours of television a week and while 81% of parents of
two to seventeen year olds “agree” or “strongly agree” they are “concerned
about the amount of violent content their children see in movies or TV,” only
34% of parents “always or often use the TV rating system to help choose what
programs their children may watch.” Id.
3
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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broadcasting, it is constitutionally sound to limit First Amendment
protection of broadcasts. 4
¶2
The first section of this paper provides an overview of the law
relating to the broadcast of obscene language and touches upon recent
developments in obscenity regulation. The second section describes various
problems associated with FCC regulation. And finally, the last section
discusses possible approaches to FCC regulation. This iBrief argues that
the FCC can fulfill its goals and objectives in a much more efficient and
expedient matter by basing its decisions in sound economic theories rather
than the pressure of overzealous interest groups.

I. OBSCENITY LAW AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
This section provides a brief overview of the history and purpose of
the FCC. It explores the body of law developed as a result of broadcast
indecency regulations. By analyzing the standards of FCC broadcast
regulation, it will be easier to highlight the problems associated with
enforcement discussed in Section II and the possible solutions to these
problems in Section III.
¶3

A. History and Purpose
The FCC was created by Congress to replace the role of the Federal
5
Radio Commission under the Communications Act of 1934. The purpose
of the FCC is to “regulat[e] interstate and foreign commerce by wire and
radio” with a centralized authority that can effectively govern these
6
entities. Congress wished to regulate indecent programming for two
principal reasons: “the unique pervasiveness of broadcasting into the
American home and the presence of young children in the viewing and
7
listening audience.”
¶4

¶5
Initially, the FCC created a slew of regulations and busied itself
8
with ensuring compliance. In Pacifica, the Supreme Court upheld the
FCC’s regulatory authority because of concerns for children and the
9
American home. However, in the years following Pacifica, the agency
4

Id. at 748.
Congress later amended the Communications Act with the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, calling it “The New 1934 Act.”
Communications Act of 1934, Pub.L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (2003) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615(b)).
6
47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
7
Id.
8
Richard E. Wiley & Lawrence W. Secrest, Recent Developments in Program
Content Regulation, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 235, 236 (2005).
9
Id.
5
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moved towards a “free market” approach in which it favored general
10
11
deregulation, focusing on the regulation of “indecent” content.

B. Indecency Analysis
¶6
Just like any other rules regulating speech in America, the FCC
broadcast regulations run squarely into the First Amendment. In the
12
seminal decision Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT III), the
court upheld regulation of broadcast programming when children were
13
likely to be in the audience. However, the court found that the hours from
10 p.m. to 6 a.m. would be designated safe-harbor hours necessitating no
regulation because children were not likely to be in the viewing or listening
14
public at that time. It has been recognized that trying to restrict indecent
material on broadcast programming interferes with the exercise of the right
15
to free speech. Thus, the Government needs to have a compelling interest
connected with its regulation in order for the regulation to be considered
16
constitutional. Interestingly enough, opinions like ACT III bring to light
the fact that courts are more than willing to find indecency regulation
17
constitutional in order to protect the well-being of children.

The FCC proceeds through a three-step analysis in determining
what constitutes indecent programming. First, a complaint must be filed by
18
Second, the FCC determines if the alleged
a member of the public.
19
offense occurred on broadcast television or on cable or satellite television.
20
The FCC indecency rules do not apply to cable or satellite television.
21
Additionally, the rules do not apply during the safe harbor hours. If these
¶7

10

Id.
Id.
12
58 F.3d 654, (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 701 (1996).
13
Id. at 662–65.
14
Id. The Court found that the Government has a compelling interest in
protecting children from seeing indecent material but the current “safe-harbor”
from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. is sufficient to meet this goal. Id. at 656.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See id.
18
FCC Complaint Process, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/process.html (last visited
Feb. 16, 2008).
19
William Davenport, Comment, FCC, Indecent Exposure? The FCC’s Recent
Enforcement of Obscenity Laws, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
1087, 1090 (construing FCC Enforcement Policy Regarding Broadcast
Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8001 (2001)). Mr. Davenport was the Chief of
the Investigations and Hearings Division on Enforcement at the FCC.
20
Davenport, supra note 19, at 1090 (construing 16 F.C.C.R. at 8000).
21
Id. at 1090–91.
11
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two conditions are met, the Commission proceeds to the final issue of
22
indecency analysis; whether the broadcast was “patently offensive based
23
on contemporary community standards.”
¶8
In order to determine whether a broadcast falls within the
community standards for indecency, the FCC makes two fundamental
24
determinations.
First, the broadcast must be indecent, which is
25
“describ[ing] or depict[ing] sexual or excretory organs or activities.”
Additionally, the broadcast must be “patently offensive as measured by
26
contemporary community standards.” The analysis in the Supreme Court
27
case of Hamling v. United States gives an example of the kind of analysis
that the FCC purports to use when evaluating each complaint with regards
to “contemporary community standards.” The analysis must not focus on
the particular standards of a judge or a localized community but rather the
28
larger community as a whole. Therefore, it is necessary for the FCC to be
as objective as possible in its interpretation in order to ensure that
regulations are being administered in an even-handed way, rather than
bending to interest groups or social pressures.

When dissecting the meaning of “patently offensive,” it is essential
29
to consider the “full context in which the material appeared.” A variety of
factors must be taken into account in order to reach a finding of patent
30
offensiveness.
In the Pacifica opinion, the Court highlighted the
necessity of taking into account the literary, political, or scientific value of
the speech as well as other factors touching upon whether the speech was
31
meant for shock value or whether there was social value to the speech.
32
The heart of this analysis relies on the First Amendment. Political speech
receives strong protection because of the central tenet that “the government
33
must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.” The opinion makes it
clear that speech reflecting on political or social ideals, thereby making
commentary on society, is fully protected by the First Amendment because
¶9

22

Id. at 1091.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
418 U.S. 87 (1974), construed in 16 F.C.C.R. at 8002.
28
16 F.C.C.R. at 8002.
29
16 F.C.C.R. at 8002–03 (construing WPBN/WTOM License Subsidiary, Inc.,
15 F.C.C.R. 1838, 1841 (2000); Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930,
931–32 (1987)) (emphasis in original).
30
16 F.C.C.R. at 8002–03.
31
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–48 (1978).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 746–46.
23
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34

of its value to society. However, that does not mean there is no First
35
Rather, the test for
Amendment protection for other types of speech.
patent offensiveness becomes more difficult because of the myriad factors
36
entering into the equation. It is important to think about all of the facts
involved and to balance privacy concerns with First Amendment
37
concerns. The appropriate conclusion should take into account both what
people would like their children to hear as well as what adults should have
38
access to.
¶10
As guidelines, the three principal factors that the regulations
consider are:

(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description of depiction of
sexual or excretory organs or activities;
(2) whether the material dwells on or repeats at length description of
sexual or excretory organs or activities;
(3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or
whether the material appears to have been presented for its shock
value. 39

These factors further emphasize the importance of placing the offending
speech in context. The regulations continue to give examples of what the
FCC has considered indecent and why, most of which depend on how far
the speech allegedly violated one of these factors. 40
¶11
Finally, after all of these factors have been considered, the FCC
41
makes a determination on the merits of the complaint. The complaint can
be: (1) dismissed, or (2) a letter can be sent to the licensee (typically the
network the broadcast was shown on) asking for more context as to the
alleged offense, or (3) there can be a notice of liability sent, and lastly, (4)
42
the case can be referred to the full commission. The licensee is afforded

34

Id. at 746.
Id.
36
These factors include the medium of expression. The Pacifica opinion
recognizes that “it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection.” Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
37
Id. at 748–50.
38
Id.
39
FCC Enforcement Policy Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999,
8003 (2001) (emphasis added).
40
Id. at 8003–15.
41
Id. at 8015.
42
Id. at 8015-16.
35
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an opportunity to respond and after circumstances have been considered, a
43
monetary penalty may be ordered by the issuance of a Forfeiture Order.

II. PROBLEMS WITH THE INDECENCY REGIME
¶12
This section touches on recent events resulting in a surge of
enforcement of broadcast indecency regulations and then highlights the first
problem of selective enforcement and prosecution. To examine this
problem, this paper will look at examples such as the Janet Jackson
costume-reveal and Howard Stern’s multiple run-ins with the FCC. The
second problem that this paper addresses is the vagueness of the indecency
standards in enforcement.

A. Recent Events
¶13
In the years following the Pacifica decision and leading up to 2004,
the FCC did not appear to care much about enforcing indecency
44
standards. In fact, in a 2001 press conference, former FCC Chairman,
45
Michael K. Powell, discussed his plans to focus on deregulation. Powell
was interested in increasing competition in the broadband market and had
plans in mind that included limiting regulatory costs and interference with
46
the communications industry.
¶14
However, Powell’s plans for deregulation were about to be thwarted
by the highly publicized “costume reveal” involving Super Bowl Halftime
47
Show performers Janet Jackson and Justin Timberlake.
During this

43

Id. at 8016.
See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, INDECENCY COMPLAINTS AND
NALS: 1993–2004 (2005), http://www.fcc.gov/eb/broadcast/ichart.pdf (last
visited Feb. 16, 2008), noted in Matthew C. Holohan, Politics, Technology &
Indecency: Rethinking Broadcast Regulation in the 21st Century, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 341, 345-46 (2005).
45
Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, “Digital Broadband
Migration” Part II (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2001/spmkp109.html.
46
Id.
47
See, e.g., Apologetic Jackson Says 'Costume Reveal' Went Awry, CNN.COM,
Feb. 3, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/02/02/superbowl.jackson. Powell
was also pushed to increase indecency regulation after the singer Bono from U2
said the word “fucking” during the airing of the 2003 Golden Globe Awards but
made no substantial effort to do so. In fact, the FCC rejected complaints that
came in regarding Bono’s use of the f-word, with a representative saying that
“fleeting and isolated remarks of this nature do not warrant commission action.”
See Associated Press, FCC OKs Bono’s F-Word Slip, CBSNEWS.COM, Oct. 7,
2003,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/17/entertainment/main573729.shtml.
44
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infamous halftime show, the duo ended their performance with Timberlake
grabbing Jackson’s breast and ripping off the material covering it, revealing
48
her nipple.
As a result of this performance, the FCC received over
49
542,000 complaints. Powell immediately expressed outrage as a result of
this “classless, crass and deplorable stunt” and ordered a complete
50
investigation. The PTC took this as the last straw and released a report
two days after the incident criticizing the FCC for failing the public and
51
subjecting children to far too much indecent material on television.
¶15
Almost immediately after the Super Bowl incident, the FCC jumped
into action, in an attempt to avoid the fallout that would result from treating
the incident lightly. Even the United States Senate decided to take action,
52
holding hearings on February 11 to discuss broadcast indecency.
Additionally, Clear Channel Broadcasting, one of the largest media
conglomerates in the country, created an initiative for more responsible
broadcasting and suspended shock-jock Howard Stern from the airwaves for
53
vulgar material. As a result of a single incident, broadcast media was
turned on its head.

B. Selective Prosecution and Enforcement
The incident created a media circus resulting in outrage on the one
54
hand and hilarity coupled with pure curiosity on the other. Additionally,
¶16

48

Id.
See In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their
February 1, 2004 Broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII Halftime Show
[hereinafter Super Bowl Complaint], 19 F.C.C.R. 19230, 19231 (2004).
50
Associated Press, FCC Chief Blasts Jackson Halftime Show, FOXNEWS.COM,
Feb. 2, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,110114,00.html.
51
See ParentsTV.org, Dereliction of Duty: How the Federal Communications
Commission Has Failed the Public [hereinafter PTC’s Dereliction of Duty],
http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/publications/reports/fccwhitepaper/main.asp,
construed in Holohan, supra note 44, at 347.
52
Holohan, supra note 44, at 347.
53
Id. at 347–48; see Howard Stern Suspended for Indecency, CNN.COM, Feb.
26, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZ/News/02/25/stern.suspension/index.html.
54
The media was in a frenzy after this incident with many referring to the
halftime show as “Breast Gate.” See, e.g., About.com, Breastgate: Janet Jackson
Humor or Bust,
http://humor.about.com/od/janetjackson/Breastgate_Janet_Jackson_Humor_or_
Bust.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008). The incident threw TiVo users for a loop,
many rewinding and repeating the incident three times more than users typically
do for other programs. See Ben Charny, Jackson's Super Bowl Flash Grabs
TiVo Users, CNETNEWS.COM, Feb. 2, 2004, http://news.com.com/21001041_3-5152141.html. It was clear though that groups were not taking this
49
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the FCC was not ready to listen to any more appeals from the networks or
affiliates that aired the halftime show and was firm on the $550,000 fine
55
that was imposed. In addition to being firm on their fine for the Super
Bowl incident, the FCC decided to be more firm on past incidents of
“indecency,” including an instance when paparazzi star Nicole Richie said
56
the word “fuck” during the 2003 Billboard Music Awards. The effect of
this incident highlights the first problem of current FCC regulation:
selective enforcement.
¶17
The problem of selective enforcement is not a new one by any
57
In fact, the problem is illustrated by the
stretch of the imagination.
58
regulatory treatment of shock jock Howard Stern. For years, Stern was
the subject of FCC selective prosecution for his very popular, but very
controversial, radio show, “The Howard Stern Show,” which was broadcast
59
Following the Janet
daily on FM radio from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.
Jackson Super Bowl incident, Stern, in fact, told reporters that he was
waiting for the FCC to come knocking on his door to give him a record60
breaking fine. However, in light of the massive backlash following the
Super Bowl incident, Clear Channel decided to play it safe and just
61
suspended Stern’s show indefinitely in several cities.

While it might be beneficial for the nation’s children to no longer
hear Howard Stern or see Janet Jackson’s breast on broadcast television,
this does not take away from the fact that these prosecutions were fueled by
public interest and outrage more than the true viability of the claims filed.
The history of FCC’s problem of selective prosecution dates back to Melody
¶18

incident lightly and many saw it as a way to reignite the debate on indecency on
television. See, e.g., Ann Oldenburg, Jackson’s Halftime Stunt Fuels Indecency
Debate, USATODAY.COM, Feb. 3, 2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/super/2004-02-02-jackson-halftimeincident_x.htm.
55
Associated Press, FCC Firm on Superbowl Indecency Fine, CBSNEWS.COM,
Feb. 23, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/23/entertainment/main1340839.shtml.
56
Id.
57
See Seth T. Goldsamt, Howard Stern, the FCC, and Selective Prosecution, 28
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 203 (1995).
58
Emil Guillermo, Howard Stern and the Burning Bush, SFGATE.COM, Mar. 9,
2004, http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2004/03/09/eguillermo.DTL.
59
Goldsamt, supra note 57, at 216.
60
See Guillermo, supra note 58 (discussing Clear Channel’s decision to suspend
Stern’s program in several cities).
61
Id.
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62

Music v. FCC. In this seminal case, the D.C. circuit made it clear that the
63
FCC must treat “similarly situated parties in a similar manner.”
The
decision made it clear that the FCC could not deny a license to one
company when another company with the same allegedly infringing actions
64
is given a license.
¶19
When Infinity (Stern’s employer) used the selective prosecution
defense in its response to indecency complaints against Stern, the FCC
stated that other programs which received indecency complaints, but were
65
later dismissed, were not “substantially similar” to Stern’s broadcasts.
These other complaints included one against a television broadcast of
“Geraldo” and another about the mysteries of sex and the broadcast of a
66
song called “Slip It In.” The FCC argued that these programs were not
designed to pander or titillate, in other words saying that these programs
67
were not vulgar in nature. This appears to be a dubious assumption if one
were to tune into daytime talk shows like “Geraldo” or “Maury Povich.”
These programs are designed to attract viewers by pandering to them with
68
Consequently, the
vulgar stories of cheating and sexual malfeasance.
FCC’s response that these shows are not within the scope of indecency that
Howard Stern’s show embodies is unconvincing and weak. The purpose of
having a defense of selective prosecution does not depend on how
substantially similar two parties are but rather, whether two parties are in a
69
“similarly situated” position. Clearly, shows like “Geraldo” and “Maury
Povich” are within the Stern show’s realm of indecency but lack the large
70
audience and publicity that his tends to garner.

62

345 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1965), construed in Goldsamt, supra note 57, at 216–
18.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Goldsamt, supra note 57, at 217–18.
66
Id. at 217–18.
67
Id.
68
For a sampling of topics on the Maury Povich show, see MauryShow.com,
This Week on the Maury Show, http://www.mauryshow.com/this_week.html
(last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
69
Goldsamt, supra note 57, at 218–19.
70
Howard Stern eventually left Clear Channel for the Sirius Satellite Radio
Network for a reported deal of $600 million. See Howard Stern Deal Balloons
to $600 Million, THE WRITE NEWS,
http://www.writenews.com/wnews.php?zone=113061 (last visited Feb. 16,
2008).
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The history of selective prosecution rests on the principle of equal
71
protection in the Constitution of the United States. In the case, Yick Wo v.
72
Hopkins, the Court said:
¶20

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the Constitution. 73

This opinion addresses the need for an even hand in trying to enforce
legislation in the United States. In another case, the Court suggested that to
succeed on a defense of selective prosecution, defendants must prove that
their prosecution was “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard
74
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”
¶21
Stern serves as an important “criminal” in the war against
indecency. While daytime talk shows like Ricky Lake, Sally Jessy Raphael,
75
and Maury Povich talk about the same illicit topics, they aren’t given as
much grief as Howard Stern because their following is not as large or
76
reactionary. Additionally, even though singers like Bono or celebrities
like Nicole Richie previously said the “F-word” on award shows, the FCC
chose not to react to these incidents because the media buzz and public
outcry around these events was not as large as the buzz and outcry
77
surrounding the Super Bowl. In Goldsamt’s article, the author argues that
selective prosecution against Stern is largely based on pressure from the
78
religious right arguing for the “biblical ethic of decency in the media.”
The article continues to suggest that Stern’s political views, which clearly
do not align themselves with the religious right, are also to blame for the

71

Goldsamt, supra note 57, at 220.
118 U.S. 356 (1886), construed in Goldsamt, supra note 57, at 220–21.
73
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 359, reprinted in Goldsamt, supra note 57, at 221.
74
Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962), reprinted in Goldsamt, supra note 57,
at 221.
75
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
76
See, e.g., Lycos.com, Top Talk Radio Personalities of 2006, Oct. 10, 2006,
http://50.lycos.com/101807.asp.
77
In 2005, Super Bowl commercials cost a staggering $2.4 million per spot,
making them the most expensive commercials on television. See Krysten
Crawford, Sanitizing the Super Bowl, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 4, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/01/20/news/fortune500/superbowl_ads.
78
Goldsamt, supra note 57, at 241–47.
72
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79

particularized campaign against him. This kind of motive, however, is
impermissible based on the selective prosecution standard set in Oyler v.
80
Boyles.
¶22
In another example, returning back to the nipple-reveal during the
Super Bowl Halftime Show, the FCC record shows that even though the
reveal was probably accidental, the FCC was going to fine CBS and its
affiliates because the producers of the halftime show knew of the “sexually
81
provocative nature of the Jackson–Timberlake segment.” This seems to
diverge from the all-inclusive test that is used in traditional indecency
82
analysis. The analysis requires that the nature of the allegedly indecent
broadcast must be so explicit and graphic, that it would be found to be
83
patently offensive by community standards. The test takes into account a
lot of factors, such as length of the broadcast, and whether the broadcast
84
was simply for shock value. The Commission, however, seemed to move
away from that thorough analysis and branded the show as provocative,
regardless of the circumstances behind the seemingly accidental nipple-slip.
The record mentions that CBS and MTV advertised that the broadcast
85
would be shocking and titillating. However, this does not answer the
question of whether the broadcast was indecent within the boundaries of the
traditional indecency analysis. Rather, all this says is that the promoters of
this Super Bowl Halftime Show wanted to attract viewership with two sexy
but not per se indecent performers.
¶23
What the Super Bowl complaint fails to address is the heart of the
indecency analysis: a thorough look into whether the exposure was designed
to “pander to, titillate and shock the viewing audience.” The FCC should
have to look at the circumstances surrounding the halftime show to really
see if there was a violation of the indecency regulations. Instead, the record
86
focuses on the fact that there were no advance precautions taken. It does
not look at the performance as a whole except to say that it was sexy and
87
In fact, the entire analysis seems to assume that the
provocative.
provocative nature of the performance makes the rest of the analysis almost

79

Stern is pro-choice and also a supporter of rights for homosexual couples. Id.
at 246.
80
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
81
Super Bowl Complaint, 19 F.C.C.R. at 19240.
82
See discussion supra Sec. I, Part B.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Super Bowl Complaint, 19 F.C.C.R. at 19240.
86
See id. at 19232.
87
Id. at 19234-36.
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unnecessary.
The rest of the performance, however, was clearly not
within the purview of the indecency analysis. While it was sexy, it was not
shocking or offensive to community standards of decency. It involved
dancing and gyrating, which, although meant to draw in the viewer,
arguably does not offend or shock viewers to their core. It was really the
one accidental act of a costume-reveal gone awry that sparked the numerous
complaints. For the FCC to say that the performance’s provocative nature
supports its finding of indecency contradicts the proposition that the FCC’s
review standards are even-handed and objective. This type of analysis
clearly goes against the regulatory policy the FCC is supposed to abide by.
¶24
The Super Bowl complaint and the Howard Stern attacks reveal the
way that the FCC selectively enforces its broadcast indecency regulations.
The more groups like the PTC pressure the FCC, the more likely the FCC
will respond. This problem highlights the fact that the FCC might have
disingenuous motivations in their “crackdown” on certain programs that
broadcast indecent material. And while this might not be per se
unconstitutional, it certainly illustrates how the FCC might not be serving
the American public, but rather, those interest groups or media outlets that
launch campaigns against programming that will garner the most publicity
for their causes.

C. Vagueness in Enforcement
The preceding analysis touches upon the next problem associated
with FCC regulation, the vagueness and indefiniteness in applying FCC
broadcast regulation. This section will cover examples like John Gotti on
National Public Radio (“NPR”) as well as a program called “Keen Eddie.”
These examples will show how FCC regulation is applied in a manner that
does not enable broadcasters to understand what the parameters of the
regulation are.
¶25

¶26
On February 8, 1989, NPR broadcast a news program on organized
crime featuring a broadcast of a wiretapped conversation between boss John
89
Gotti and his associate. Here is an excerpt from that broadcast:

JG [John Gotti]: Listen, I called your fucking house five times
yesterday. Now if you want (unintelligible) fuck (unintelligible) Now
if you want to disregard my fucking phone calls I'll blow you and the
fucking house up.
OV [Associate]: I never disregarded anything.
88

Id at 19236-37.
FCC Letter to Mr. Peter Branton, 6 F.C.C.R. 610 (1991), reprinted in B. Chad
Bungard, Indecent Exposure: An Economic Approach to Removing the Boob
from the Tube, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 195, 214 (2006).
89
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JG: Are you, call your fucking wife or will you tell her.
OV: All right.
JG: This is not a fucking game I (unintelligible) how to reach me days
and nights here, my fucking time is valuable.
OV: I know that.
JG: Now you get your fucking ass (unintelligible) and see me
tomorrow.
OV: I'm going to be here all day tomorrow.
JG: Never mind all day tomorrow (unintelligible) if I hear anybody
else calling you (unintelligible) I'll fucking kill you. 90

The FCC made a determination that the broadcast was not indecent because
it was not “patently offensive” and was simply showing evidence from a
91
widely reported trial. However, the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Ervin S. Duggan points out the flaws in the FCC’s analysis of this particular
92
While this was a news broadcast that was meant to show
broadcast.
Gotti’s character to the audience, there was no need for the phone
conversation to be played in its entirety for the audience to understand
93
Gotti’s vulgarity. The former Commissioner, although recognizing the
need for context in making indecency determinations, found that the
repeated use of the “F-word” fit precisely within the definition of pandering
94
that the regulations disallow.
The FCC’s decision in this case makes it difficult for indecency
regulation to be enforced with any sort of uniformity. By adding
journalistic quality to their programs, Howard Stern and Maury Povich
could arguably escape FCC regulations and air as much indecent material as
they wanted to. While the John Gotti wiretap was aired on NPR with a
news-reporting purpose, it also was put on the air to shock viewers and cater
95
to a very lowbrow taste.

¶27

¶28
The next example that this paper will examine is a broadcast
regarding sexual innuendo of bestiality on the Fox program “Keen

90
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Id. at 613.
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Id. at 616.
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96

Eddie.”
In this broadcast, the episode’s dialogue between men and a
prostitute in a stable is reprinted below:
Prostitute: No, that’s not natural.
First Man: Extraction for insemination. If you look at the picture on
page 45 you’ll see how natural it is.
Prostitute: Forget it!
Second Man: You’re a 40-year-old filthy slut, you’ll do anything
(referring to an advertisement by the prostitute to which the men
responded).
Prostitute: With a human.
First Man: Think of it as science. 97

This material was found not to be indecent by all accounts because the
material was not deemed to be explicit or graphic and the woman
98
(prostitute) did not actually do anything with the horse. The scene was
found not to pander, shock, or titillate and by all accounts, was rather short
99
(less than a minute).
¶29
In a dissenting statement, Commissioner Kevin J. Martin highlights
100
He points out
some of the problems associated with this determination.
that the entire purpose of this program, broadcast during the time when
children were likely to be in the audience, was to shock the audience into
thinking that this prostitute was hired for the sole purpose of servicing a
101
horse.
While the prostitute does not approach the horse or actually touch
the horse, it is an uncomfortable scene that does seem to shock and pander
102
to the audience.
¶30
It seems unbelievable that the FCC found this not to be indecent
considering the fact that the entire purpose of this sketch was to shock the
audience into thinking that the woman on this show was going to have
sexual intercourse with a horse. Comparing this to the Super Bowl
Halftime Show, it seems ridiculous that this show falls outside of the FCC’s

96

In re Complaints Against Fox Television Stations, Inc. Regarding Its
Broadcast of “Keen Eddie” Program on June 10, 2003, 19 F.C.C.R. 23063
(2004), reprinted in Bungard, supra note 89, at 216-18.
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Id. at 23064.
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Id. at 23066.
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reach. In the analysis from the halftime show, the FCC argued that the
103
provocative nature of the performance necessitated FCC involvement.
In
this case, the sketch was designed precisely to pander to the audience’s
basest humor and make the audience feel uncomfortable at the thought of a
prostitute having sex with a horse.
¶31
These examples illustrate the fact that the FCC does not seem to
apply its indecency standards with any sort of rhyme or reason. Rather, it
seems that the FCC is much more likely to react to a complaint if it is
associated with a high-profile program like the Super Bowl or a high-profile
entertainer like Howard Stern. These complaints are precisely within the
purview of the FCC’s indecency regulations yet no action was taken
because arguably, there was no media attention given to these programs.
¶32
Effectively, the problems of selective enforcement and vagueness in
the application of regulations are inextricably linked to the fact that the FCC
appears to be more interested in pleasing interest groups and the media
rather than working towards its actual goals and purposes. Although it
could be argued that the FCC accomplished some good for the American
people by fining CBS for airing Janet Jackson’s costume-reveal or
effectively stopping Howard Stern from exposing children to his indecent
radio show (at least on AM/FM radio), there are enough programs to fill in
where these entertainers left off. As long as the FCC continues to answer to
the calls of interest groups, the religious right, and media outlets before
thinking about applying its regulations in an even-handed fashion, the
Commission will continue to be doubted by many First Amendment
advocates and well-informed citizens.

III. TAKING THE LIBERTARIAN APPROACH
This section will attempt to find a more palpable and economicallysound approach to FCC regulation. While many argue that FCC regulation
104
this iBrief will attempt to take a more pragmatic
is not necessary,
approach. The way that the law stands, the Supreme Court agrees with the
FCC, finding that protecting children from indecent programming is a
compelling interest, and therefore, allowing broadcast regulation within the

¶33

103

See discussion supra Sec. II, Part A.
See, e.g., Holohan, supra note 44, at 368-69. Holohan argues that the
“technological underpinnings” of the Pacifica decision as well as broadcast
indecency regulations are gone as a result of more advanced technology. Id.
Consequently, he says that because of this incompatibility of technology and
regulation, it is time for the Pacifica rationale to be overturned because of its
inapplicability to current society and thus, full First Amendment protection
should be given back to broadcasters. Id.
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105

boundaries of reduced First Amendment protection.
Additionally,
considering the current strength of the FCC and the reluctance of any
politician to say the FCC should be removed, there is a need for a more
pragmatic solution to these problems. Therefore, although Holohan and
other like scholars present compelling arguments for no regulation at all,
this is not the direction that courts nor legislators are likely to take.
¶34
However, in order for FCC regulation to rid itself of the problems
that were described in Section II, it is necessary to examine the value of two
approaches based on economic theory rather than interest group-fueled
enforcement. The first approach attempts to apply the Condorcet Jury
Theorem to FCC regulation and the second suggests that indecency
regulation should be guided by paying attention to the viewer-advertiser
relationship and lowering information costs for viewers.

A. The Condorcet Jury Theorem
¶35
In Bungard’s paper, the Chief Counsel/Deputy Staff Director for the
House Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce and Agency Organization
suggests that the Condorcet Jury Theorem be applied to industry
106
regulation.
The Condorcet Jury Theorem was designed by Marquis de
Condorcet as a mechanism to “justify the use of majority rule and to assess
107
The theory is explained by
the optimal size of a deliberative body.”
Edelman:

Suppose that there are n voters who must decide between two
alternatives, one of which is correct and the other incorrect. Assume
that the probability that any given voter will vote for the correct
alternative is greater than one-half. Then the probability that a
majority vote will select the correct alternative approaches as the
number of voters gets large. 108

Bungard’s paper uses examples to illustrate how the Condorcet Jury
109
From a single decision-maker model to
Theorem works in practice.
110
majority rule with a five-decision maker model, the examples show how
the probability that the correct decision will be reached increases as the
number of decision makers increases. However, it is necessary to note that
a unanimity rule does not work in a situation with a lot of decision makers
105

See discussion supra Sec. I, Part B.
Bungard, supra note 89, at 228.
107
Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem,
31 J. LEGAL. STUD. 327, 327 (2002), interpreted in Bungard, supra note 89, at
228.
108
Id. at 327.
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110
Id.
106

2008

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 3

111

because of the high probability of deadlock.
Additionally, it is necessary
for all of the assumptions behind the Condorcet Jury Theorem to be present,
those being “a common probability of being correct across all individuals,
each individual’s choice is made independent of the others and each
112
individual votes sincerely, taking only his judgment into account.”
¶36
In order for each individual to have a common probability of
reaching a correct decision, the decision makers must have a clear
understanding of the facts in the case they are reviewing and also be well113
Additionally, the
versed in the broadcast regulations they are applying.
decision makers must have a greater than 50% chance of reaching the right
114
answer.
Third, decisions must be made independently and without
115
This is extremely important
reliance on other decision makers.
considering the effect of interest groups and bandwagon politics in FCC
116
It is necessary for
decisions. Lastly, decisions must be made good faith.
decision makers to come to their decision on their own and have belief in
the veracity of their vote.
¶37
Assuming that all of these assumptions are in place, Bungard argues
that FCC regulations should be able to be implemented with “near-perfect
117
What Bungard suggests is the creation of an indecency board
results.”
118
within the FCC modeled after this theorem.
The paper, like this one,
also finds that application of the indecency regulations is central to the
119
By creating a review board, the paper argues that
FCC’s problems.
problems will be alleviated because of the ability of the board to come to
120
The
conclusions without being plagued by outside influences or advice.
process is regimented as well: (1) the complaint is sent to the board, (2) it is
then sent to FCC staff for additional fact inquiry, (3) the board receives
additional information, (4) and the members of the board each decide
121
whether the complaint falls within the FCC’s definition of “indecent.”
¶38
This model attempts to depoliticize the FCC by modeling itself after
a theorem that in many ways can be likened to outside directors or counsel
in a corporation. However, this model is based on an assumption that a
111

Id. at 230.
Id. at 230–31.
113
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person is more than 50% likely to come to the “correct” answer, if one
exists. The trouble with this assumption is that indecency regulations lack
the definition necessary to give board members the ability to find the correct
answer. The American legal system is based on the common law
methodology of looking to past cases to find the answers in the present.
This is difficult when board members must look to such divergent examples
as the Super Bowl Complaint as opposed to the Keen Eddie or John Gotti
Complaints.
¶39
However, this does not mean that the model does not have some
benefits. It would be a vast improvement over the old system in which FCC
Commissioners themselves are the ones that write the decisions. In this
new system, the slate appears to be wiped clean and decision makers are
122
Additionally,
appointed by the President in consultation with Congress.
the paper suggests that in order to further depoliticize the process, the
President should be limited to six members of his own party in appointing
123
the board.
And lastly, because this board is in place, the FCC is in a
position to review all complaints of indecency and therefore, it cuts interest
groups off at the pass by having a systematic and even-handed response to
124
Therefore, there is no
all alleged violations of indecency regulations.
need for a media blitz to move the FCC to respond to a complaint because
each complaint is addressed by a large board that can even-handedly apply
indecency regulations by the standards that set in opinions like Pacifica and
Action for Children’s Television.
¶40
So, while there are arguable difficulties with the necessary
assumptions that the Condorcet Jury Theorem necessitates, the revisions
that Bungard suggests are likely to alleviate the problems of selective
prosecution and vagueness in enforcement currently plaguing the FCC. The
next example takes yet another economic approach to the problem and
relies more on the relationship between the advertiser and audience.

B. The Advertiser-Viewer Relationship
¶41
Current indecency regulation is based on the public trustee
125
This doctrine states that “’the People’ own the airways, and
doctrine.
they, through their elected officials and delegated agencies, condition the
126
However, Brown and Candeub
granting of licenses to use the airways.”
suggest that regulation focus on advertisers for the precise reason that they
122

Id. at 236-37.
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Keith Brown & Adam Candeub, The Law and Economics of Wardrobe
Malfunction, 2005 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1463, 1466 (2005).
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are the ones funding the media markets that regulation aims to rid of
127
indecency.
The scholars looked at the economic realities of the
broadcast industry and use that knowledge to create a system in which
information is more freely traded between advertisers and viewers in order
128
for viewers to pressure advertisers that sponsor indecent broadcasting.
The paper bases its theory on the idea that broadcast television and
129
In a two-sided market, a firm must answer to two
radio are “two-sided.”
130
The example that Brown and
different sets of customers and consumers.
Candeub give is retailers, selling to consumers but also doing business with
131
In a similar relationship, broadcasters must think
credit card companies.
about two different consumer groups that they must attract: viewers and
132
However, Brown and Candeub argue that the problem with
advertisers.
broadcast regulation is that it focuses on only one part of the relationship
that broadcasters have to deal with - the relationship between broadcaster
133
and viewer.
By changing the dynamic and making advertisers more
involved in the relationship, “to the extent that advertisers learn which
content makes viewers less receptive to their advertisements, advertisers
134
obtain value from being involved with indecency regulation.”
¶42

¶43
This leads to the question of how this relationship becomes the
focus of indecency regulation. First, the FCC must mandate that
broadcasters provide information about the advertisers that buy commercial
135
time from them.
This is within their broad authority under the
136
Considering that broadcasters already
Communications Act of 1934.
maintain records about their sponsors for typical business records reasons,
137
the transaction costs for companies would be rather low.
¶44
The paper proposes two ways of carrying out the effects of this type
of disclosure to the public; either implementing new methods in
concordance with current regulation or replacing current regulation

127
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Id. at 1500.
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138

altogether.
By mandating disclosure to viewers who advertise on a
certain program, the viewer can contact the advertiser directly with
complaints about the indecent programming that the company is
139
sponsoring.
Replacing the current regime completely with this method
would put the burden on the viewer to actively send a message to that
advertiser. Second, the authors suggest that this system could give viewers
140
If
another outlet in addition to the way that regulation exists presently.
viewers feel that the FCC is not taking an active role in enforcing indecency
regulations against a certain station or program, then viewers can take a
more active role and send a message to certain advertisers that their
141
sponsorship of certain programs is not okay.
¶45
This does not mean that advertisers must respond to every
142
Rather, advertisers, would now have an
complaint that they receive.
active role in determining how indecent programming affects their bottom
line and can weigh the costs and benefits of sponsoring an allegedly
143
The point is that opening up the lines of
indecent broadcast.
communication between viewers and advertisers gives both parties more
information and more control over the programs that each party chooses to
144
watch or sponsor.

The aim of this change proposed by Brown and Candeub seems to
address the problem of vagueness in indecency regulation. Rather than
have a governmental body try and decide what the public deems to be
indecent, the public takes an active role in contacting advertisers and
signaling to them that they find their sponsorship of a certain program to be
inappropriate. Therefore, advertisers are able to understand what exactly
the “community standards” are and what the public considers to be indecent
enough to tune out from. By opening up the discourse between advertisers
and viewers, there is more efficiency in the market because viewers are able
to contact those firms that sponsor and fund the programming that they are
watching.
¶46

¶47
However, the ills of this program are numerous. In many ways, it is
a call to interest groups to be much more aggressive in contacting firms and
airing their grievances. While transaction costs might be low for the firms
as well as the FCC, the problem with this type of change is that it puts a
burden on the everyday viewer to communicate his/her preferences. The
138

Id. at 1503.
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 1504.
143
Id.
144
Id.
139

2008

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 3

likelihood that a viewer will decide to be pro-active and communicate with
a company, letting that company know that its sponsorship of a certain
program is inappropriate, is very low. In many ways, the change in
regulation that Brown and Candeub suggest simply gives interest groups
another address to send their numerous and overzealous complaints, rather
than encouraging the rest of the American public to help regulate broadcast
indecency themselves.
¶48
The problem with Brown and Candeub’s paper is that they have
little faith in the public trustee doctrine, which is the basis for most
regulatory bodies today. Although this is a typical libertarian argument
posed by numerous scholars who are more apt to let the free market decide
everything rather than bureaucracy, it fails to recognize the realities of the
political system that Americans have inherited. The American political
system is based precisely on the idea that representation is the best way for
the public to get exactly what it needs. Because Americans have a system
in which they depend on their Congressperson to fight for their “wants and
needs” in Washington, D.C., we have inadvertently sponsored a system in
which Congress has created bodies that regulate the different subjects of
interstate commerce that our representatives feel need some sort of rule of
law.
¶49
So although this method does have a free market basis that
encourages communication between different players in the radio and
television market, it fails to address the current political realities that exist
today. While the FCC’s current regulations might be arguably inefficient
from an economist’s point of view, they cannot be altogether done away
with unless we are ready to change the political system that we live with
today.

CONCLUSION
¶50
In the wake of events like Janet Jackson’s infamous costume reveal,
FCC regulation is now once again a topic on many people’s minds. While
the FCC standards, which are guided by the language from the Pacifica
decision, necessitate even-handedness and a high degree of attention to
community standards of decency, in practice they are more likely to be
guided by the pressure of interest groups and media coverage. This paper
looked at two theories based on economic principles aimed at remedying
FCC problems.

The first proposed revision used the Condorcet Jury Theorem to
create a system that seeks to add some sort of impartiality to FCC
enforcement. While the system was based on assumptions that may be
difficult to achieve in practice, in many ways, the system seems to be the
¶51
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most practical way to move the FCC away from being a puppet of interest
groups.
¶52
The second proposed revision was based on traditional principles of
an efficient capital market. It necessitated that the FCC provide viewers
with information on the advertisers that sponsor programming on television.
By providing this information to viewers, viewers could then contact
advertisers directly and to voice their concerns about the allegedly indecent
programming that the sponsor is funding. In response, advertisers could
make a business judgment as to whether the viewer’s complaint has merit
and either continue sponsoring the product and possibly lose some share of
the market or discontinue sponsorship as a result of the information that the
viewer provided. While this proposed revision was interesting and based on
sound theories of efficient capital markets, it failed to address the concern
that interest groups will most likely contact advertisers and thus artificially
control advertisers’ decisions.
¶53
Both of these proposals highlight the inefficiencies of the current
system. While neither may be the appropriate choice for the FCC, it is clear
that in order for the purpose and goals of the FCC to be met, there needs to
be some way to address the problems of selective enforcement and
vagueness. Otherwise, it will be difficult for broadcasters to ever determine
how to tailor their programming appropriately. This ambiguity in
regulation stunts the broadcast market and invariably results in wasted time
and effort by companies in the entertainment industry.

